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The Rapid Support Forces\u2019 control of the Heglig oilfield means that the most important functioning oil facility in Sudan has fallen outside the control of the central government, with production halted and workers evacuated towards neighbouring South Sudan.<\/p>\n
The importance of this event is not merely symbolic; Heglig is a strategic hub on three levels:<\/p>\n list of 4 items<\/span>end of list<\/span><\/section>\n The Heglig field processes between 80,000 and 100,000 barrels per day for the benefit of Sudan and South Sudan, and the pipeline to Port Sudan passes through it. This means that its loss delivers a direct blow to what remains of the Port Sudan government\u2019s cash revenues \u2013 including fees from the transit of South Sudanese oil.<\/p>\n Heglig represents the last major strategic position for the army in West\/South Kordofan after the fall of el-Fasher, the capital of Darfur, and Babnusa in West Kordofan. The army\u2019s withdrawal from the field \u2013 even if justified as being for the \u201cprotection of facilities\u201d \u2013 reflects a shift in the balance of power in the region in favour of the RSF and their allies.<\/p>\n The Heglig field is highly sensitive as it is part of a shared oil network with South Sudan. \u00a0And historically, it has been a point of dispute between Khartoum and Juba (the 2012 crisis being an example). Now, it has become the subject of a new contention between Sudan\u2019s army and the RSF, with a third harmed party being the government of Juba.<\/p>\n In this sense, the fall of Heglig will raise the cost of continuing the war for the government to an unprecedented level since April 2023, as it strikes at the last \u201ceconomic pillar\u201d on which the army\u2019s authority in the east and north could rely.<\/p>\n From a politico-military perspective, the effect of losing the Heglig oilfield can be read in three overlapping directions:<\/p>\n First<\/strong>: strengthening the RSF\u2019s ability to impose new negotiating realities. After the fall of el-Fasher in October, talk began that the RSF was working to consolidate a semi-autonomous \u201cDarfur\/Kordofan region\u201d as a base for later pressure on Khartoum. Control of Heglig will undoubtedly give the RSF economic weight and allow its leader Hemedti to claim that he controls not only territory but also a strategic resource equivalent to a \u201cstate card\u201d.<\/p>\n Second<\/strong>: The control of Heglig restricts the army\u2019s ability to finance its operations and maintain local loyalties, confirming that this loss comes after losing most of Darfur\u2019s and western Sudan\u2019s gold to the RSF and its networks. This now means that the army\u2019s resources will rely on foreign support, seeking war funding and procuring weapons and equipment from abroad. In the future, Khartoum will also have to depend on internal taxation in the east and north \u2013 namely, what remains of South Sudan\u2019s oil transit fees, if they continue. This places a major challenge before the army\u2019s ability to sustain a long war of attrition with the same momentum.<\/p>\n Third<\/strong>: The possible shift of the main battlefront between the army and the RSF to the \u201cel-Obeid \u2013 Kadugli \u2013 Dilling\u201d axis. Field analyses reported in recent news coverage suggest the RSF will use its momentum in Heglig to advance towards Dilling and Kadugli, and possibly Abu Jubeiha, in preparation for strangling el-Obeid. This would mean that the Battle of el-Fasher was the \u201cbattle of the west\u201d and the Battle of Heglig could be the \u201cgateway to the south-central battle\u201d.<\/p>\n However, it is important to note that holding Heglig does not mean the RSF can immediately exploit the oil, given the evacuation of the technical staff to South Sudan. The technical complexities of operating the entire pipeline mean that, for now, control is more of a disruption and pressure card than a stable production asset.<\/p>\n In the short term, the greater effect will be depriving Khartoum of revenue, not efficiently transferring it into the RSF\u2019s coffers.<\/p>\n All indicators suggest that the cost of continuing the war for the government is rising both economically and politically, but this does not automatically mean an immediate readiness for settlement, for the following reasons:<\/p>\n The military leadership\u2019s discourse in Port Sudan is still based on the idea that any early settlement with the RSF would mean rewarding a \u201crebel militia\u201d and possibly the end of the historical army. Therefore, the decision tends towards continuing the fighting despite the high economic cost, in the hope of greater external support or internal shifts within the opponent\u2019s camp.<\/p>\n The army is also betting on clearer support from certain regional countries, such as Egypt, and some international powers that see the RSF as a threat to their own regional security. Meanwhile, the RSF is betting that control over territory and resources will make many capitals deal with it as a reality that cannot be ignored.<\/p>\n https:\/\/www.youtube.com\/watch?v=TIMg9YAXvcY<\/a><\/p>\n The fall of the city of el-Fasher militarily, followed by the fall of the Heglig oilfield into RSF hands, may not yet push both sides to a serious negotiating table; rather, violations and massacres may increase. This suggests that Heglig alone will not be enough to pivot towards a settlement, but it does accelerate the exhaustion process that could make regional and international players more insistent on negotiations.<\/p>\n There is no doubt that the battle of Heglig, which was decided in the RSF\u2019s favour, will increase economic pressure on General Burhan\u2019s government and weaken its position, but the shift towards accepting serious negotiations depends on the accumulation of such defeats combined with external pressure from sponsoring states, rather than on this single event.<\/p>\n How will the balance of power be redrawn?<\/strong><\/p>\n If we place the fall of the Heglig oilfield on a timeline alongside the fall of el-Fasher, a broader picture emerges: El-Fasher was the last major army stronghold in Darfur; its fall after a siege lasting more than 500 days made it difficult to imagine the army\u2019s return to the region in the foreseeable future, and opened the door to the emergence of a de facto entity led by the RSF.<\/p>\n Human rights reports and United Nations monitoring referred to large-scale massacres, forced displacement, and the intensive use of drones by both sides, with attacks on medical facilities and schools.<\/p>\n \u00a0<\/p>\n https:\/\/www.youtube.com\/watch?v=nr3zurjKRQY<\/a><\/p>\n The RSF\u2019s decisive victory in el-Fasher accelerated the shift of confrontation to Kordofan, which acts as a \u201cbridge\u201d between the west and the centre. The RSF\u2019s movements in West and South Kordofan, allied in some areas with the Sudan People\u2019s Liberation Movement\u2013North (al-Hilu), have turned the region into a knot of three-way conflict: The army, the RSF, and an armed movement with a longstanding political project.<\/p>\n Redrawing the map of control remains highly complex; some media reports suggest that the possibility of dividing Sudan into a north and east under army control, and a west, most of Darfur, and wide parts of Kordofan under RSF control and its allies, has become increasingly noticeable.<\/p>\n This scenario means the war has entered a phase of \u201cregional geopolitics\u201d rather than merely being a battle over Khartoum. In this context, Heglig is not just an oil target, but a link in a project of regional expansion parallel to the central state.<\/p>\n In recent weeks, multiple indications of the new United States administration\u2019s role have emerged, stated more than once by the president, especially during his meeting at the White House with Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, who invited President Trump to intervene personally to help end the war in Sudan, within a four-party coordination framework (Saudi Arabia, UAE, Egypt, US).<\/p>\n US Secretary of State Marco Rubio has said Trump \u201cis personally overseeing efforts to end the war in Sudan\u201d, along with a warning to Sudan against allowing Russia to have a naval base on the Red Sea.<\/p>\n International newspapers reported last week that the Sudanese government in Port Sudan offered Russia a 25\u2011year agreement to establish its first naval base in Africa, granting Moscow access to the Red Sea, in addition to gold mining benefits. These reports suggest that the base would give Russia a strategic foothold to monitor navigation to and from the Suez Canal, a development that worries the US, which is competing with Moscow and Beijing for military influence in Africa. In return, Sudan would receive Russian weapons and air defence systems at preferential prices to confront the RSF. However, Sudanese officials warn that the deal could expose the country to problems with Washington and the European Union. US officials and military experts believe a Russian base in Port Sudan would enhance Moscow\u2019s ability to project power in the region and raise its international standing.<\/p>\nRecommended Stories <\/h2>\n
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