\n<\/p>\n
Israel\u2019s recognition of Somaliland on December 26 had little to do with the long-standing aspirations of communities living in the breakaway region of Somaliland in northwest Somalia. It was, instead, a product of shifting geopolitics and a rapidly fragmenting global order. An issue once confined to the margins has since been pulled into the centre of regional and international power rivalries.<\/p>\n
The Horn of Africa and the Red Sea corridor, anchored by the Bab al-Mandab Strait, one of the world\u2019s most vital maritime chokepoints, have become arenas of intense competition. Israel, the Gulf countries, Turkey, Egypt, Ethiopia, Eritrea and China are all now deeply engaged. Within this context, Israel\u2019s recognition of Somaliland signals something broader: the growing use of secessionist movements as disruptive instruments of geopolitical strategy across the Middle East and the Horn of Africa.<\/p>\n
What some experts\u00a0describe as an \u201cAxis of Secession\u201d is already visible in Libya, Yemen, Sudan, Somalia and Syria. Led by Israel and supported by a network of regional partners, this axis targets countries whose central governments, hollowed out by conflict, exercise only partial control over their territory. The logic is simple: weaken central authority, bolster breakaway regions, and cultivate dependent entities willing to align with Israel and sign onto the Abraham Accords.<\/p>\n
For Israel, these emerging client polities offer strategic footholds in volatile regions. From them, it can monitor rivals, project power, secure key maritime routes and expand intelligence networks. Over time, Israel also hopes this strategy will coerce \u201cmother states\u201d into reluctantly joining the Abraham Accords themselves. Yet this approach carries a contradiction. Rather than consolidating the accords, it risks destabilising the region further and eroding their legitimacy. Saudi Arabia, long regarded by Washington and Tel Aviv as the ultimate prize of regional normalisation, has taken the lead in assembling a concerted effort to block the Axis of Secession.<\/p>\n
Beyond broader geopolitical rivalries, Israel\u2019s recognition of Somaliland is closely tied to competition over access to the Red Sea. The Bab al-Mandab Strait, which links the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden, carries around 10 percent of global trade. Control over ports and coastlines along this route confers outsized leverage over international commerce. Somaliland\u2019s long coastline has therefore become a strategic prize. By recognising Somaliland, Israel seeks to entrench itself within the Horn of Africa\u2019s strategic geography.<\/p>\n
This competition was evident in January 2024, when Ethiopia signed a controversial Memorandum of Understanding with Somaliland, offering political recognition in exchange for access to the sea. For Ethiopia, the world\u2019s most populous landlocked country, the deal carried obvious strategic appeal. Yet it proved short-lived. In December 2024, following Turkish-brokered talks in Ankara, Somalia and Ethiopia agreed on a framework that reaffirmed Somalia\u2019s sovereignty and pointed to sea access arrangements under Somalia\u2019s authority, signalling a retreat from the earlier recognition-for-access logic. The episode highlighted both the fragility of such arrangements and the intensity of the geopolitical contest surrounding Somaliland\u2019s status.<\/p>\n
China has also become an increasingly active player. Somaliland\u2019s decision to cultivate ties with Taiwan inevitably drew Beijing\u2019s attention, given China\u2019s strict adherence to the \u201cOne China\u201d policy and its view of any engagement with Taipei as a direct challenge. At the same time, China has consistently supported Somalia\u2019s sovereignty and territorial integrity, using its diplomatic and economic leverage to counter what it sees as destabilising secessionist dynamics. Beijing is now working to dissuade key regional actors, including Ethiopia, from recognising Somaliland.<\/p>\n
For China, the Horn of Africa is not only about ports, shipping lanes and mineral resources. It is also about preventing the spread of separatist precedents and countering moves that could embolden Taiwan. The result is an increasingly crowded and volatile theatre, where global power rivalries intersect with unresolved local aspirations.<\/p>\n
Israel\u2019s recognition of Somaliland has accelerated a wider realignment in the Middle East. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, once close partners, are now increasingly at odds, while Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Egypt have begun coordinating to counter what they view as a destabilising \u201cAxis of Secession\u201d.<\/p>\n
This shift was first set in motion by the advance of the Southern Transitional Council in Yemen, which announced a transition towards declaring an independent state, and was then sharply reinforced by Israel\u2019s recognition of Somaliland. For Saudi Arabia, these developments represented a direct threat to its sphere of influence and national security. In response, Riyadh has taken the lead in assembling a new regional alignment that brings together Turkey, Egypt and Qatar to push back against secessionist movements and their external sponsors.<\/p>\n
Each member of this emerging alliance brings distinct concerns. Egypt fears that recognising Somaliland would embolden Ethiopia, with which it remains locked in a bitter dispute over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam. Turkey, which has invested heavily in Somalia\u2019s security and economic sectors for more than a decade, sees state fragmentation as a direct challenge to its strategic interests in the Horn of Africa. Saudi Arabia views the Axis of Secession as an existential danger, beginning in Yemen, where secessionist advances directly undermine its security. Together, these states are positioning themselves as defenders of sovereignty and regional cohesion, while also coordinating diplomatic efforts to dissuade Washington from following Israel\u2019s lead.<\/p>\n
For Somalia, the implications are stark. Anchoring its foreign policy within this emerging alliance is no longer a matter of preference but of urgency. Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Turkey and Qatar all have a direct stake in preserving Somalia\u2019s sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence. Yet Somalia\u2019s external relations has too often been erratic, marked by mixed signals and internal contradictions. At a moment of existential threat, hedging between competing blocs is no longer viable. Somalia must urgently recalibrate its diplomacy, using its geostrategic importance to forge durable and credible partnerships.<\/p>\n
Equally critical is the need for domestic political cohesion. With parliamentary and presidential elections scheduled for May, the Federal Government of Somalia must work to build consensus among key political stakeholders on unresolved and divisive issues, including the controversial 2024 amendments to the Provisional Constitution and the framework for credible elections. President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud has so far shown limited willingness to compromise. Failure to secure urgent domestic consensus risks creating openings for Israel and its regional proxies to exploit Somalia\u2019s internal divisions.<\/p>\n
Ironically, Somaliland\u2019s pursuit of international recognition may have been undermined by its reliance on Israel. Israel\u2019s global standing, already severely damaged by its genocide in Gaza, has made recognition by Tel Aviv politically toxic across much of the Arab and Muslim world. Rather than advancing Somaliland\u2019s case, the association risks deepening its isolation.<\/p>\n
The move also carries domestic consequences. A significant segment of Somaliland\u2019s population opposes normalising relations with Israel, particularly amid widespread claims that Israel is exploring resettlement of Palestinian refugees from Gaza in\u00a0Somaliland \u2014 an allegation the leadership of the breakaway region denies. Instead of consolidating sovereignty, Somaliland now faces the prospect of internal dissent alongside growing external resistance.<\/p>\n
These challenges are compounded by changing realities on the ground. Somaliland no longer exercises control over all the territory it claims as the former British Somaliland. In July 2025, a new federal member state, the Northeast State of Somalia, was established in large swathes\u00a0of this territory and swiftly pledged allegiance to the Federal Government of Somalia. Its emergence has reinforced Somalia\u2019s territorial integrity and further weakened Somaliland\u2019s bid for international recognition.<\/p>\n
At the diplomatic level, Israel\u2019s decision has triggered a wave of international support for Somalia. Key regional and global organisations, including IGAD, the African Union, the Arab League, the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation, the European Union and India, have all reaffirmed Somalia\u2019s sovereignty and territorial integrity. Even the United States, Israel\u2019s closest ally, joined other members of the UN Security Council in restating its commitment to Somalia\u2019s unity. What was intended as a breakthrough for Somaliland has instead strengthened Somalia\u2019s diplomatic position, exposing the paradox of recognition in an increasingly fragmented international system.<\/p>\n
Unless Israel succeeds in persuading US President Donald Trump to recognise Somaliland, an uphill task given the countervailing weight of the Saudi-led alliance, hopes of a wider domino effect appear to have reached a dead end.<\/p>\n
Israel\u2019s recognition of Somaliland is not an isolated act but part of a broader strategy, the so-called Axis of Secession, which exploits fragility in war-torn states from Libya and Yemen to Sudan, Somalia and Syria. By empowering breakaway regions, Israel, with the backing of key regional partners, especially the United Arab Emirates, has sought to reshape the regional order. Instead, it has provoked determined resistance.<\/p>\n
Ethiopia\u2019s aborted Memorandum of Understanding with Somaliland, China\u2019s assertive defence of Somalia\u2019s sovereignty, and the deepening rupture between Saudi Arabia and the UAE all underscore the volatility and limits of this approach. For Somaliland, the decision to tie its recognition strategy to Israel has backfired, increasing its diplomatic isolation while internal opposition grows and territorial control weakens.<\/p>\n
For Somalia, the lesson is equally clear. Its survival as a sovereign state now depends on urgency, internal cohesion and firm alignment with the emerging Middle East alliance that has positioned itself against fragmentation and secession. Far from advancing secessionist ambitions, Israel\u2019s recognition of Somaliland has reinforced the international consensus around Somalia\u2019s territorial integrity. It has also exposed the limits of recognition as a geopolitical instrument in an increasingly fractured global order.<\/p>\n
The views expressed in this article are the author\u2019s own and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera\u2019s editorial stance.<\/strong><\/em><\/p>\n<\/div>\n Israel\u2019s recognition of Somaliland on December 26 had little to do with the long-standing aspirations of communities living in the breakaway region of Somaliland in northwest Somalia. It was, instead, a product of shifting geopolitics and a rapidly fragmenting global order. An issue once confined to the margins has since been pulled into the centre […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":8826,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[10],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-8825","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-opinion"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/inernews.online\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/8825","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/inernews.online\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/inernews.online\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/inernews.online\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/inernews.online\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcomments&post=8825"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/inernews.online\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/8825\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/inernews.online\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/media\/8826"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/inernews.online\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fmedia&parent=8825"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/inernews.online\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcategories&post=8825"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/inernews.online\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Ftags&post=8825"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}
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