It’s not the oil. It’s Florida | Nicolas Maduro

On Saturday, United States military forces carried out a dramatic strike in Venezuela that resulted in the capture and forcible removal of President Nicolas Maduro and his wife, Cilia Flores. They were flown to New York and are now in federal custody. Maduro appeared in federal court on drug and weapons charges and pleaded not guilty. Several governments, international legal experts and United Nations officials have described the military operation as an illegal “kidnapping” and a breach of international law. The UN secretary-general warned that it sets a “dangerous precedent”, undermining foundational norms of sovereignty under the UN Charter.

Yet, as Washington justifies its operation primarily with rhetoric about oil and narcotics, a deeper inspection reveals another dynamic: This was first and foremost an ideological battle, shaped by domestic political incentives in the US – in particular the strategic influence of Florida’s electorate and its political elite.

Oil is not the prime motive

The mainstream narrative frames Venezuela’s enormous oil reserves – officially among the largest proven in the world at roughly 298 billion to 303 billion barrels – as the core strategic prize. But a closer, evidence-based analysis shows the immediate economic rationale to be weak.

US crude imports from Venezuela, once significant, have dwindled to about 220,000 barrels per day (bpd) as of 2024, representing less than 4 percent of US crude imports. By contrast, imports from Canada dominate, accounting for roughly 60 to 63 percent of US crude import needs, and US production of light crude has risen sharply, reducing dependence on foreign sources. This shift undermines claims that Venezuelan oil alone is a strategic imperative.

Why does Venezuelan crude matter at all? The answer lies in its composition. Venezuelan oil is heavy and sour, the type that many US Gulf Coast refineries were designed to process. This, however, reflects refinery configuration rather than any compelling immediate strategic case. Furthermore, Venezuelan oil infrastructure has deteriorated over years of underinvestment with output falling from about 3.5 million bpd to roughly 1 million bpd by 2025, and a meaningful revival would require many years of sustained and consistent investment. Markets reacted only modestly to the capture of Maduro with global oil prices remaining relatively stable, suggesting that oil was not the main driver of the operation.

Not drugs either: Pretext vs reality

US officials have cited drug trafficking and “narcoterrorism” as part of the justification for the intervention. Maduro and other senior Venezuelan officials are indicted in the US on charges linked to alleged cocaine trafficking, and these accusations have been reiterated in court. However, research by international agencies and independent analysts suggests that, while Venezuelan territory is used as a transit route, it is not a major source of the drugs entering the US, which are overwhelmingly produced and trafficked through Mexico, Central America and the Caribbean. This gap between the scale of the drug trade and the rationale invoked has led many analysts to view the narcotics argument as a pretext rather than a primary driver of the operation.

Florida, ideology and domestic political incentives

A more persuasive rationale emerges when the domestic political incentives shaping US foreign policy are examined, particularly the role of Florida’s electorate and elite networks. With 31 electoral votes, Florida remains a pivotal state in presidential elections, where narrow margins mean even modest shifts among key constituencies can determine national outcomes.

This political reality is reinforced by Florida’s large and politically mobilised Latino communities. Cuban American voters have long prioritised anti-communist foreign policy positions while Venezuelan American communities, many of whom settled in the state over the past decade, have expressed strong opposition to authoritarian leftist governance in Caracas. Political scientists note that these constituencies constitute a significant voting bloc in closely contested elections, giving political elites strong incentives to adopt hardline positions against leftist regimes that resonate with these voters.

At the centre of this dynamic stands Marco Rubio, the US secretary of state and a Florida native whose political biography is deeply rooted in opposition to leftist governments in Latin America. Rubio’s family fled communist Cuba, and he has consistently championed confrontational policies towards socialist and authoritarian regimes in the region. Reports suggest that, during negotiations, Maduro offered concessions on oil and economic matters that could have been commercially beneficial, but advisers aligned with Florida’s political interests reportedly pushed for a harder line, prioritising ideological confrontation over economic pragmatism.

Florida’s political ecosystem also includes influential donor networks that have historically supported hawkish foreign policy positions, including well-organised pro-Israel constituencies with leverage at state and national levels. In recent months, high-profile visits by Israeli leaders to Florida and sustained engagement with US political figures have reinforced ideological alignments that frame regimes perceived as hostile to Israel or aligned with its adversaries as challenges requiring decisive responses. The convergence of electoral incentives, ideological commitments and elite networks helps explain why US policy towards Venezuela has been shaped as much by domestic political drivers as by external strategic interests.

Lessons for the Middle East

The implications for Middle Eastern actors are profound.

First, international law appears weakened. The US capture of a sitting head of state without multilateral authorisation underscores a willingness to sidestep international legal norms when domestic political imperatives are prioritised. The ineffectiveness UN Charter’s prohibition on the use of force absent Security Council approval or clear self-defence appears to have been discounted, eliciting global concern.

Second, the Middle East’s strategic relevance persists, albeit in an evolving context. While global energy markets are less dependent on Middle Eastern oil than in prior decades, other factors – capital flows, counterterrorism cooperation, strategic geography and enduring security partnerships – maintain the region’s importance. Intensifying US-China competition and Washington’s concern over closer China-Middle East ties will likely continue to anchor US engagement in the region. Israel, for its part, is expected to sustain robust lobbying efforts in Washington and European capitals to preserve its strategic relationships.

Yet the Venezuela episode illustrates that alliances predicated chiefly on energy security can be fragile and ideological and domestic political drivers can abruptly reshape foreign policy priorities. Middle Eastern states must, therefore, pursue a calibrated diplomatic strategy: engaging the US where interests converge while hedging against abrupt shifts driven by internal political calculations.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera’s editorial stance.